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Abstract  
After a service failure, citizens expect a recovery strategy that restores perceived justice and 
places a reasonable value on their loss. Offering monetary compensation is a strategy commonly 
used in private settings, but less so in public settings. To date compensation effects have not 
been researched in public settings. To investigate citizens’ evaluations of perceived justice, 
negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction we used a 2 (sector: public, private) by 2 
(compensation promised: yes, no) by 2 (compensation offered: yes, no) factorial between-
subjects experimental design (student sample), and replicated this in a second study (US-
citizens sample). Results showed that compensation leads to similar positive effects in public 
and private settings confirming earlier private setting research that applied justice theory. 
Explicitly promising compensation prior to a service encounter had no effect. However, 
promising compensation and not offering it led to decreased citizens’ evaluations, which 
confirms expectancy disconfirmation theory.  
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Introduction 
A driver’s license that is not available at the agreed date, or a citizen who has waited too long 
at a counter are both examples of operational service failures. They are inevitable and part of 
daily life (Kim and Ulgado 2012) because services are intangible, hard to standardise and 
production and consumption happen simultaneously (Murray and Schlachter 1990). They are 
little studied in public management literature and how citizens recover satisfaction after a 
service failure (service recovery) even less (Van de Walle 2016). This paper uses service 
management literature from the private domain as its theoretical base. Here, justice theory 
(Adams 1965) is the dominant framework to explain customers’ evaluations and behaviour after 
a service failure. It argues that customers evaluate the fairness of service recovery on 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice (e.g. Homburg and Fürst 2005; Vázques-
Casielles et al. 2010). Expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993) states that differences 
between expectations and experiences (e.g. for justice dimensions) can lead to positive or 
negative disconfirmations, which subsequently influence post-recovery satisfaction (e.g. Van 
Ryzin 2013). Perceived justice and satisfaction after a service failure are influenced by how 
organisations operate after a failure; for example, by apologising, fixing the problem and/or 
offering compensation. Monetary compensation is a common recovery instrument to improve 
perceived justice and satisfaction after a service failure (e.g. Wirtz and Mattila 2004). 
Compensation schemes exist in the private domain (e.g. hotels and airlines) and the semi-public 
domain (e.g., railways, city transport and energy supply) but are less common in core public 
organisations. Public organisations also differ in whether they explicitly promise to compensate 
when a service failure occurs.  
 
To understand public compensation, we researched the effects of promising and offering a small 
monetary compensation on customers’ evaluations of perceived justice, negative emotions and 
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post-recovery satisfaction in public and private settings. We used a between-subjects factorial 
design across Dutch students (study 1) and replicated this study using a US online panel (study 
2) to increase external validity. Our results contribute to theory in two ways. First, by adding to 
the literature on the research theme. Second, this is the first experimental study to apply justice 
theory in public service recovery settings. Justice theory emerges as applicable to public as in 
private settings. The next sections elaborate by reviewing current empirical service 
management literature on service failures, service recovery, justice theory and monetary 
compensation to formulate hypotheses. Then the experimental methodology and results are 
presented. We conclude by discussing limitations and finally suggest future research.  
 
Service failures 
New Public Management ideas suggest public organisations increasingly approach citizens as 
customers (Aberbach and Christensen 2005). Customer satisfaction metrics have become 
important for public managers (Van Ryzin 2013).  Therefore, public management scholars 
(Osborne et al. 2015) argue for a service-dominant logic approach (Lusch and Vargo 2014) to 
place customers, rather than products, policy makers or professionals, at the heart of service 
research, design and operations. From this perspective, service failures are defined as situations 
in which customers experience an economic (e.g., money, time) and/or a social loss (e.g. status, 
esteem) due to a mishap or a problem when experiencing a public service (Kim and Ulgado 
2012) regardless of responsibility (Magnini et al. 2007). Service management literature 
categorise failures by their type and severity. First, there are process and outcome failures (Tsai 
et al. 2014). Process failures occur during service delivery and involve how customers receive 
the service. Whereas, outcome failures involve what customers actually receive. Outcome 
failures include delay versus denial failures. A delay requires customers to wait to receive 
service, whilst denial is the total breach of a (implicit) contract (Levesque and McDougall 
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2000). Second, the severity or importance of a failure depends on customers’ perceived 
cumulated economic and social loss resulting from service failure. Failures range from 
unimportant and mildly annoying through to extremely important and very severe (Mattila, 
2001; Magnini et al. 2007). The type of failure and the severity both affect customers’ perceived 
loss and unfairness. 
 
Service recovery and justice theory 
Service recovery involves actions organisations take to respond to service failure to make up 
for the perceived loss sufficient to regain customers’ satisfaction (Mattila 2001; Hocutt and 
Bowers 2005). The larger the loss customers feel, the more recovery they seek (Kim and Ulgado 
2012). Justice theory (Adams 1965) sees customers evaluating recovery fairness in 
interactional, procedural and distributive terms. Interactional justice is the perceived fairness of 
treatment by employees. Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the organisation’s 
recovery policies and processes. Distributive justice is the perceived fairness of the outcome, 
such as a monetary compensation. Many studies show that, depending on the service and service 
failure context, the relative impact of these three justice dimensions on post-recovery 
satisfaction is different (Mattila 2001; Del Rìo-Lanza et al. 2008).  
 
Expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993; Van Ryzin 2013) sees customer satisfaction 
being determined by the difference between customers’ experiences and their expectations. 
This is relevant for service recovery experiences and expectations resulting in post-recovery 
satisfaction. For most situations customers have expectations, these are norms and standards or 
benchmarks against which customers judge or measure the quality of service they receive 
(Magnini et al. 2007). Expectations are influenced by factors such as past experiences, word-
of-mouth and communication by the organisation (Zeithaml and Bitner 1996). Expectations are 
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‘formed in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have 
been, might have been, or should have been’ (Kahneman and Miller 1986, p. 136). In literature, 
expectations are divided into positive and normative expectations (e.g. Yim et al. 2003; James 
2011). Positive expectations are customers’ predictive norms concerning what actually will 
happen. Normative expectations are based on what should happen according to the customer, 
for example concerning service recovery after a service failure. 
 
Monetary compensation for poor service 
Monetary compensation is a financial value customers receive in order to (partly) balance the 
perceived economic and/or social loss due to a service failure. Authorities and governments 
have obliged semi-public organisations to offer monetary compensation for poor service. For 
example, railways and public transport offer compensation schemes for punctuality and 
reliability (Björlin Lidén and Edvardsson 2003) and energy supply companies for outage and 
other service failures (Costello 2012). While monetary compensation is common in semi-public 
and private organisations, it is rare for core public organisations given ethical and legal 
arguments. Ethically, as public organisations are financed by taxpayer money, this should be 
spent on the collective and not on individual customers. Also, compensating individuals may 
increase inequality in service delivery between customers (Fountain 2001; Van de Walle 2016). 
Legally, national legislation could influence the possibilities to offer compensation. As in 
private settings, customers can expect quality service without failures and value for the money 
when they pay indirectly through taxes or directly through fees for services. When failure 
occurs, compensation helps balance the loss. Thus, it makes sense for public organisations to 
offer compensation for poor service.  
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Like service failures, monetary compensation can be categorized by type and size. The type and 
size have to match the type (Roschk and Gelbrich 2014) and severity (Gelbrich et al. 2015) of 
the failure to be effective. Monetary types of compensation include gift vouchers and coupons, 
discounts, money back or free products and services (e.g. Lii and Lee 2012). Compensation is 
offered proactively or reactively after a complaint and on the spot at the time of the failure or 
delayed (Kim and Ulgado 2012). The compensation size varies from no compensation, a small 
and token compensation not directly related to nor fully compensating for the loss, to equity 
compensation equal to the loss or even overcompensating customers. Research in private 
settings shows that compensation size has effects on customers’ evaluations (Hocutt and 
Bowers 2005; Haesevoets et al. 2017). Offering a small compensation that is given as a token 
or gesture to customers has different effects on customers’ evaluations than fully compensating 
or overcompensating customers (McQuilken et al. 2013; Gelbrich et al. 2015). In our studies 
we researched the effects of a small compensation after a service failure because being overly 
generous following a service failure may lead customers to question the reasons behind offering 
compensation (McQuilken et al. 2013) and having possible problems with spending large sums 
of public money on compensating for failures (Björlin Lidén and Edvardsson 2003). 
 
What exactly happens when customers experience service failure? First, there is customers’ 
cognitive appraisal of justice dimensions comparing experiences with expectations. The 
perceived justice elicits a negative emotional reaction (Schoefer and Ennew 2005) such as 
regret, annoyance, irritation, anger and feeling betrayed (Mattila 2001). Both perceived justice 
and negative emotions impact post-recovery satisfaction. Research shows compensation can 
have positive effects on post-recovery satisfaction via the increase in perceived distributive 
justice (e.g. Wirtz and Mattila 2004; Schoefer and Ennew 2005) and the reduction of negative 
emotions (Del Rìo-Lanza et al. 2008). The specifics of how compensation is offered relates to 
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procedural aspects which we also study. Previous literature suggests that procedural justice has 
a positive effect on post-recovery satisfaction (Vázques-Casielles et al. 2010).  
 
Justice theory has yet to be applied in public service recovery research. However, we believe it 
is highly relevant for public management research; especially in direct exchange situations 
when public customers pay directly for the service (Alford 2002). The first hypothesis (H1) 
about offering compensation after service failures in direct exchange situations is: perceived 
justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more positive when compensation is 
offered (Comp) compared to when it is not offered (NoComp) after a service failure.  
 
Note: to help interpretation in the results sections we use abbreviations of cell names as 
presented in the hypotheses; Prom (a compensation is promised) versus NoProm (no 
compensation is promised) and Comp (a compensation is offered) versus NoComp (no 
compensation is offered).  
 
Promising compensation 
Our research also focuses on the effects of explicitly promising compensation prior to a service 
failure by using service charters (see Thomassen et al. 2014 for an overview of the concept). 
For example, the parking department of the Dutch municipality of The Hague used a service 
charter for several years (The Hague 2005). It promised five specific service levels: e.g. waiting 
no longer than 15 minutes at the reception desk and a reaction to customer letters within two 
weeks. If the department failed to meet promised service levels, customers received 
compensation by either selecting a gift or donating €12.50 to a charitable cause. When explicitly 
promised, compensation acts as a cue increasing customers’ expectations when compared with 
situations where no compensation is promised. According to expectancy disconfirmation theory 
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(Oliver 1993) we could argue that promising compensation has negative effects on customers’ 
evaluations. This leads to H2: in situations where compensation is promised explicitly and 
offered (Prom-Comp), perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more 
negative than when compensation has not been promised but is offered (NoProm-Comp).  
 
In H1 we hypothesised that compensating customers would lead to more positive evaluations. 
In H2 we expect that when compensation is offered, promising compensation leads to less 
positive evaluations. When combining these hypotheses, the question is whether offering 
compensation (promised or not-promised) leads to more positive evaluations than when 
compensation is neither promised nor offered. We hypothesise in H3: when compensation is 
offered, either with (Prom-Comp) or without prior promise (NoProm-Comp), perceived justice, 
emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more positive compared to when compensation is 
neither promised nor offered (NoProm-NoComp).  
 
Double deviation: failures in service recovery 
Making promises creates a risk when you cannot keep them. Services management research has 
shown that more than half of all attempted recovery efforts reinforce dissatisfaction because of 
failed service recoveries (Casado-Díaz and Nicolau-Gonzálbez 2009). The expectancy 
disconfirmation theory explains this so-called double deviation effect. Explicitly promising 
compensation increases customers’ expectations. Not keeping this promise leads to extremely 
low levels of customers’ evaluation and their criticism damaging the organisation (Casado-Díaz 
and Nicolau-Gonzálbez 2009). Hypothesis 4a is: when compensation is promised, but not 
offered (Prom-NoComp), perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more 
negative compared to when compensation is not promised nor offered (NoProm-NoComp). The 
related hypothesis 4b is: when compensation is promised, but not offered (Prom-NoComp), 
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perceived justice, emotions and post-recovery satisfaction are more negative compared to when 
compensation is offered, both promised (Prom-Comp) and not promised (NoProm-Comp).  
 
Public – private differences 
We expected that overall the effects would be similar in public and private settings for all four 
hypotheses. Citizens have other relationships with public services beyond those of a customer 
- a user, a voter, a recipient and a taxpayer (Milakovich 2003). Also, as public organisations are 
often financed by taxpayers’ money this will likely influence how customers evaluate public 
organisations offering compensation (Björlin Lidén and Edvardsson 2003). However, in 
situations where customers pay directly for services, their money is directly related to the value 
they receive (Alford 2002). Also, experiences in private settings might influence customers’ 
public service expectations. Finally, increasing marketization of public services, and the 
introduction of many private management and customer relation innovations, may have shifted 
customers’ expectations to levels similar to those found in the private sector. Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 (H5) is: the effects as hypothesized in H1-2-3-4 are similar in public and private 
settings. 
 
Overview of experiments 
We used two survey experiments involving students and a large and heterogeneous sample of 
US-citizens as proposed by Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016). We first studied our 
hypotheses in an experiment with a student sample (for an overview of (dis)advantages of using 
students see Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen 2016, p. 114). We recognise the limitations of a 
relatively homogeneous and small sample and to further validate results employed a follow-up 
replication study with a larger and more heterogeneous sample of US-citizens. The similarity 
of results allowed some theoretical generalization. Both survey experiments used a 2 (sector: 
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public, private) by 2 (compensation promised: no, yes) by 2 (compensation offered: no, yes) 
between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight 
scenarios as graphically presented in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical presentation of the (in)dependent variables 
  
Our aim was not to study types of service failures and recovery, other than the compensation 
aspect, which we needed to keep constant. Both experiments employed one service failure – 
service recovery configuration with a delay type of process failure that could be solved later 
(for a full description of scenarios, see Appendix I). The customer had ordered a product and 
was informed that it was ready for collection at a pick-up point. At the counter the customer 
found it was not there, but would be available the next day. Subsequently, we manipulated 
Promising Compensation by adding in the Prom-vignettes that the customer sees the promise: 
occurence of a 
service failure 
dependent 
variables: 
- distributive justice 
- procedural justice  
- negative emotions 
- post-recovery 
satisfaction 
promising 
compensation 
offering 
compensation 
sector 
public 
none	
private 
Prom 
NoProm 
Comp 
NoComp 
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‘We keep our promises, if not, you’ll get a gift voucher worth 5 dollar/euro’. We manipulated 
Offering Compensation by only offering the gift voucher in the Comp-vignettes. For monetary 
compensation we used a small and token compensation worth 5 dollar/euro that was given on 
the spot and proactively offered since the failure could be rectified the next day. It is of note 
that the way in which employees interact with customers in a recovery situation is important 
and affects post-recovery satisfaction. However, the focus of our research was on the effects of 
compensation. We kept aspects related to interactional justice (such as offering an apology) 
constant in all scenarios. Therefore, interactional justice was not measured as a dependent 
variable.  
 
Study 1: Student sample 
Independent and dependent variables 
To manipulate Sector, we presented participants with a vignette within a municipality context 
(applied for a new drivers’ license after expiration) or an Internet store (ordered a gift). We 
measured four dependent variables. An overview of the items and Cronbach’s Alphas is given 
in Appendix II. Distributive justice was measured using an adapted Lii and Lee (2012) scale. 
For procedural justice and our proactive compensation offer we created a new three-item scale 
since current scales are based on situations where customers have to complain to receive 
compensation. Negative emotions were measured using the Mattila (2001) scale. For post-
recovery satisfaction we used the scale applied by Huang and Lin (2011). As control variables, 
we asked participants to indicate the perceived severity of the failure (Mattila 2001) and realism 
of the scenario (Magnini et al. 2007). Finally, we asked participants three manipulation check 
questions verifying participant’s understanding of the vignette. We tested and found that the 
data met all requirements to run factorial analyses of variance – ANOVAs (e.g. Field, 2013).  
 
Data collection, sample and validity check  
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A total of 160 undergraduate students from a Dutch university participated for course credits. 
They visited the research laboratory and completed the on-line questionnaire in one-person 
cabins. Two students did not comply with the criterion of being Dutch, and were excluded 
because of possible national differences in reputations and relationships with public 
organisations. One participant failed two out of three manipulation checks and was excluded 
from the dataset. We included participants with one mistake, as the results were similar to 
exclusion. This resulted in 157 valid cases (Mage = 21.3, SD = 2.0; 43.9% female). For this 
initial test of our focal hypothesis, we took an investigative approach to the determination of 
sample size. An a priori power analysis using G*power (Faul et al. 2009) with a medium effect 
size (d = 0.25) and power of 80%, indicated a sample size of 128 participants in total.  
 
Results  
Control variables: a full factorial ANOVA on perceived severity of failure yielded no 
significant main or interaction effects. Also, age and gender had no significant effects on the 
dependent variables. An ANOVA on perceived realism of the scenario however yielded main 
Sector and Compensation effects. The internet store scenario (Minternet store = 4.79, SD = 1.52) 
was perceived as significantly more realistic (F(1,149) = 22.53, p = .000) as the municipality 
scenario (Mmunicipality = 3.62, SD = 1.79). Also, not offering compensation (Mno = 4.88, SD = 
1.61) was perceived as significantly more realistic (F(1,149) = 30.70, p = .000) as offering 
compensation (Myes = 3.56, SD = 1.63). This implies realism might explain our effects as well. 
We also ran ANCOVAs with realism as a covariate as a robustness check. These analyses 
resulted in similar results as presented below, only with main effects of Sector disappearing in 
ANCOVAs.  But one of the assumptions of ANCOVAs is that the covariates (in this study for 
example ‘realism’) should not be dependent from the independent variables (see Miller and 
Chapman 2001; Gerber and Green 2012). Since this is the case in our study, we cannot use 
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realism as a covariate and therefore we report the results of ANOVAs. We discuss this issue 
further in the general discussion.   
 
General results: Table 1 summarizes the results of the ANOVAs, including all main and 
interaction effects for all dependent variables. Below we discuss the effects directly related to 
hypotheses 1-5. Only H1 could be directly tested with these main and interaction effects alone, 
since the specific mean cell values have to be compared. For example, the double deviation 
condition Prom-NoComp has extreme low values and influences the overall Prom- and Comp-
means tested in the main effects. To compare specific cell means and study the hypotheses 2-
5, additional simple contrast analyses were used as part of the ANOVAs. For hypothesis 3 
(NoProm-NoComp versus Prom-Comp) and for hypothesis 4b (Prom-NoComp versus 
NoProm-Comp) non-adjacent cell means were tested by separately calculating t-values based 
on the involved cell means, SDs and N per cell (cf. Lakens 2013). We used significance levels 
of 0.05 and confidence intervals of 95.0% throughout.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of four ANOVAs (significant effects in bold)  
 Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Negative 
Emotions 
Post-recovery 
Satisfaction 
 Wilks F 
(1,149) 
p-
value 
Wilks 
F 
(1,149
) 
p-
value 
Wilks 
F 
(1,148
) 
p-
value 
Wilks 
F 
(1,148
) 
p-
value 
promising 
compensation  
1.65 0.201 21.36 0.000 9.85 0.002 5.40 0.021 
offering 
compensation 
55.58 0.000 61.32 0.000 22.04 0.000 39.76 0.000 
sector 0.66 0.417 7.35 0.008 0.81 0.369 6.53 0.012 
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sector * promising 
compensation 
0.38 0.540 0.00 0.977 0.55 0.459 2.00 0.160 
sector * offering 
compensation 
0.33 0.567 0.30 0.584 0.02 0.887 2.85 0.094 
promising 
compensation * 
offering 
compensation 
1.15 0.285 24.80 0.000 13.32 0.000 0.57 0.452 
sector * promising 
compensation * 
offering 
compensation 
0.03 0.873 0.00 0.988 0.39 0.536 1.75 0.188 
 
 
The effects of Offering Compensation (H1) 
Results of the ANOVAs show that there are main Offering Compensation effects for all 
dependent variables. The pattern of means (Comp versus NoComp) moves as we hypothesised 
(see Table 2) concluding that H1 can be confirmed.  
 
Table 2. Observed Means and Standard Deviation (between parentheses) 
 
 
Main effects 
n Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Negative 
Emotions 
Post-
recovery 
Satisfaction 
NoProm  77 3.93 (1.33) 4.75 (1.46) 3.64 (1.53) 3.02 (1.16) 
Prom  80 3.68 (1.39) 3.78 (1.77) 4.39 (1.69) 2.62 (1.13) 
NoComp  78 3.09 (1.10) 3.43 (1.54) 4.60 (1.67) 2.30 (0.97) 
Comp  79 4.50 (1.23) 5.08 (1.43) 3.47 (1.44) 3.31 (1.11) 
Public  77 3.72 (1.30) 3.97 (1.72) 4.14 (1.68) 2.61 (1.04) 
Private  80 3.87 (1.42) 4.54 (1.63) 3.92 (1.62) 3.01 (1.23) 
Interaction effect Promising*Offering compensation 
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 NoProm-
NoComp 
38 3.32 (1.16) 4.46 (1.25) 3.77 (1.64) 2.57 (0.99) 
 Prom- 
NoComp 
40 2.88 (1.01) 2.46 (1.09) 5.38 (1.29) 2.05 (0.90) 
 NoProm-
Comp 
39 4.52 (1.22) 5.04 (1.60) 3.53 (1.43) 3.44 (1.17) 
 Prom-
Comp 
40 4.48 (1.25) 5.11 (1.25) 3.41 (1.46) 3.18 (1.05) 
Interaction effect Sector*Promising*Offering compensation 
public NoProm-
NoComp 
18 3.22 (1.19) 4.22 (1.34) 3.88 (1.72) 2.83 (0.98) 
 Prom- 
NoComp 
20 2.93 (0.99) 2.23 (0.97) 5.45 (1.20) 1.90 (0.69) 
 NoProm-
Comp 
19 4.34 (1.24) 4.70 (1.86) 3.82 (1.44) 3.78 (1.14) 
 Prom-
Comp 
20 4.39 (1.15) 4.77 (1.22) 3.38 (1.64) 3.52 (1.16) 
private NoProm-
NoComp 
20 3.41 (1.16) 4.67 (1.15) 3.68 (1.61) 2.25 (0.93) 
Prom- 
NoComp 
20 2.83 (1.05) 2.68 (1.17) 5.30 (1.40) 2.20 (1.06) 
NoProm-
Comp 
20 4.69 (1.21) 5.37 (1.27) 3.25 (1.40) 3.09 (1.11) 
Prom-
Comp 
20 4.56 (1.37) 5.45 (1.22) 3.45 (1.29) 2.85 (0.83) 
 
 
 
 
The effects of Promising Compensation (H2 and H3) 
Page 17 
 
As Table 1 shows, Promising Compensation had a significant effect on procedural justice, 
negative emotions and post-recovery satisfaction. Of more interest was the effect of Promised 
Compensation, which was qualified by Offered Compensation (i.e. the interaction effect was 
significant) for procedural justice and negative emotions. To better understand this interaction, 
we used simple contrast analyses to test whether Offering Compensation without prior promises 
(NoProm-Comp) would lead to more positive evaluations when compared to where 
compensation is promised (Prom-Comp). The results showed that these two scenarios do not 
lead to significant differences in distributive justice (p = 0.881; SE = .264), procedural justice 
(p = 0.800; SE = .292), negative emotions (p = 0.716; SE = .330) and post-recovery satisfaction 
(p = 0.365; SE = .225). Hence, H2 cannot be confirmed. 
To verify whether Prom-Comp and NoProm-Comp would result in more positive evaluations 
than NoProm-NoComp (H3), we used simple contrasts and t-tests. When combined, these 
reveal that H3 could be confirmed for post-recovery satisfaction, distributive and procedural 
justice, but not for negative emotions. Distributive justice for NoProm-Comp was significantly 
higher (p = 0.000; SE = .268) than for NoProm-NoComp. Also, Prom-Comp led to a 
significantly higher level than NoProm-NoComp (t(76) = 4.24, p = 0.000). Procedural justice 
for NoProm-Comp was significantly higher (p = 0.048; SE = .295) than NoProm-NoComp. 
Also, procedural justice for Prom-Comp was significantly higher than NoProm-NoComp (t(76) 
= 2.30, p = 0.025). However, there were no differences on negative emotions between NoProm-
NoComp and NoProm-Comp (p = 0.467; SE = .337), nor with Prom-Comp (t(76) = -1.03, p = 
0.309). Finally, both participants in NoProm-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .230) and in Prom-Comp 
(t(76) = 2.64, p = 0.010) scenarios were significantly more satisfied than in NoProm-NoComp 
scenarios.  
 
The effects of double deviation (H4) 
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We used simple contrast analyses to test whether a double deviation, i.e. Prom-NoComp, would 
be significantly more negative than NoProm-NoComp. H4a could be confirmed for procedural 
justice (p = 0.000; SE = .294), negative emotions (p = 0.000; SE = .335; for cell means, see 
Table 2) and post-recovery satisfaction (p = 0.032; SE = .229), but not for distributive justice 
(p = 0.099; SE = .266).  
In hypothesis H4b, we stated that for all four dependent variables Prom-NoComp would lead 
to significant more negative evaluations than for NoProm-Comp and Prom-Comp. We used 
simple contrast analyses to compare Prom-NoComp with Prom-Comp, and separate t-tests to 
compare Prom-NoComp with NoProm-Comp. The results show that this hypothesis can be 
confirmed for all dependent variables. Prom-NoComp does lead to a significant lower 
distributive justice than Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .263) and NoProm-Comp (t(77) = -6.52, 
p = 0.000). Procedural justice in the Prom-NoComp was significantly lower compared to both 
Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .290) and NoProm-Comp (t(77) = -8.39, p = 0.000). Negative 
emotions for Prom-NoComp were significantly higher than for Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = 
.328) and NoProm-Comp (t(77) = 6.04, p = 0.309). Finally, post-recovery satisfaction for Prom-
NoComp was significantly lower than for Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .224) and NoProm-
Comp (t(77) = -5.93, p = 0.010). 
 
Differences between two sectors (H5) 
To study whether Sector made a difference in the hypothesised effects of promising and offering 
compensation, we looked at the main and interaction effects involving the sector. Sector did not 
moderate the dependent variables by interaction effects with promising or offering 
compensation, suggesting H1-4 are true for both public and private settings. We did find 
significant main Sector effects (see Table 1) for procedural justice (Mpublic = 3.97, SD = 1.72; 
Mprivate = 4.54, SD = 1.63) and post-recovery satisfaction (Mpublic = 2.61, SD = 1.04; Mprivate = 
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3.01, Sd = 1.23). However, we must be careful interpreting these effects given that Sector also 
influenced our control variable. We will elaborate on this in the General Discussion. 
 
Study 2: Online US panel 
Independent and dependent variables 
As recommended by Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016) we replicated study 1 with a 
larger, more heterogeneous sample employing the same stimuli, but with one change. Because 
of differences in the process of acquiring driving licenses between The Netherlands and USA, 
for the public setting we selected a governmental organisation that issues visa (see Appendix 
I). Promising and offering compensation were manipulated similar to study 1. Also, the 
dependent variables were identical to those in study 1 (for items and reliability measures, see 
Appendix II). 
 
Data collection, sample and validity check  
Based on the findings in Study 1, we anticipated a small effect size (d = .10). Power analyses 
using G*power (Faul et al. 2009) for our 8-condition design (α = .05 and power of 80%), 
suggested to at least have 787 participants. Because of potential dropouts of participants, we 
recruited a heterogeneous set of participants (N = 1055) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) online panel. This is a suitable sampling frame for public experiments according to 
Jilke et al. (2016) and Stritch et al. (2017). The MTurk population (MTurkers) is not a random 
sample of the US-population and hence not statistical representative. However, according to 
Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen (2016) experiments do not necessarily have to rely on random 
samples. The population of MTurkers is compared with student samples and standard internet 
panels very diverse in terms of demographic characteristics (Buhrmester et al. 2011). Also, 
considerable research has shown that MTurk research replicated in surveys, experimental 
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studies and behavioural laboratory research found few substantial differences (Jilke et al. 2016).  
Another criticism is that MTurk workers are paid so little; one may wonder whether they take 
the experiment seriously (Paolacci et al. 2010). But Hauser and Schwarz (2016) showed in three 
online studies that MTurkers are more attentive to instructions than student pools.  
To tackle the possible effects of this attentiveness problem, to ensure a high reliability of the 
dataset and increase statistical power, we employed an identical procedure to that used by Jilke 
et al. (2016). First, we excluded 43 participants based on wrong answers of an instructional 
manipulation check question. Second, 17 respondents with two mistakes out of three 
manipulation check questions on the sector, promising and offering compensation were 
excluded. We included participants with one mistake, as the results were similar to exclusion. 
The highest and lowest 1% percentile in terms of total survey completion time (N=16) and 33 
respondents with an overlapping IP-address were excluded. Finally, 9 non-US citizens were 
excluded from the dataset. This led eventually to a sample of 937 valid cases (Mage = 38.3, SD 
= 12.35; 47.8% female; US nationality), ensuring sufficient power. 
Results  
Control variables: a full factorial ANOVA on perceived severity of the failure yielded a main 
Sector effect (F(1,928) = 6.355, p = .012; Mvisa = 5.36, SD = 1.46; Minternet store = 5.60, SD = 
1.29). An ANOVA on perceived realism yielded a main Sector (F(1,929) = 13.205, p = .000; 
Mvisa = 5.61, SD = 1.47; Minternet store = 5.93, SD = 1.14) and a main Compensation effect 
(F(1,929) = 26.525, p = .000; Myes = 5.55, SD = 1.47; Mno = 5.99, SD = 1.12). Both sector and 
realism can have a significant effect on the dependent variables. Also for this study we ran 
ANCOVAs as robustness checks showing only minor differences in Sector effects. The 
limitations are discussed in the general discussion. As in study 1, age and gender did not have 
significant effects on the dependent variables.  
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Table 3. Summary statistics of four ANOVAs (significant effects in bold) 
 
 
 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Negative 
Emotions 
Post-recovery 
Satisfaction 
 Wilks 
F 
(1,929) 
p-
value 
Wilks F 
(1,929) 
p-
value 
Wilks 
F 
(1,929) 
p-
value 
Wilks F 
(1,929) 
p-
value 
promising 
compensation  
1.88 0.171 16.72 0.000 0.09 0.767 0.58 0.446 
offering 
compensation 
407.37 0.000 655.85 0.000 122.55 0.000 299.129 0.000 
sector 0.74 0.391 1.34 0.237 5.00 0.026 1.44 0.230 
sector * 
promising 
compensation 
1.89 0.196 6.15 0.013 0.19 0.663 0.21 0.645 
sector * 
offering 
compensation 
0.89 0.345 0.31 0.578 0.67 0.412 0.85 0.357 
promising 
compensation 
* offering 
compensation 
6.66 0.010 60.12 0.000 2.66 0.103 2.41 0.121 
sector * 
promising 
compensation 
* offering 
compensation 
2.39 0.123 5.09 0.024 0.05 0.821 0.05 0.816 
 
 
 
General results: Table 3 summarizes the results of the ANOVAs including all main and 
interaction effects for all dependent variables. As in study 1, we discuss these effects directly 
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related to the hypotheses 1-5. Similar to the first study, we used additional simple contrast 
analyses and separate t-tests to compare means of different scenarios. For all our analyses, we 
used significance levels of 0.05 and confidence intervals of 95.0%.  
 
The effects of Offering Compensation (H1) 
ANOVAs for the dependent variables yielded significant main effects on all dependent 
variables (see Table 3). The pattern of means was as expected by the hypothesis (see Table 4), 
concluding that H1 can be confirmed.  
 
Table 4. Observed Means and Standard Deviation (between parentheses) 
 
 
Main effects 
n Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Negative 
Emotions 
Post-
recovery 
Satisfaction 
NoProm  470 3.20 (1.69) 3.77 (1.66) 5.55 (1.43) 2.43 (1.42) 
Prom  467 3.07 (1.80) 3.42 (1.92) 5.52 (1.48) 2.37 (1.38) 
NoComp  469 2.18 (1.27) 2.47 (1.38) 6.03 (1.17) 1.71 (0.94) 
Comp  468 4.09 (1.62) 4.72 (1.43) 5.03 (1.54) 3.09 (1.45) 
Public  476 3.21 (1.78) 3.68 (1.83) 5.42 (1.50) 2.47 (1.44) 
Private  461 3.06 (1.70) 3.50 (1.78) 5.65 (1.39) 2.33 (1.37) 
Interaction effect Promising*Offering compensation 
 NoProm-
NoComp 
236 2.36 (1.24) 2.98 (1.41) 5.97 (1.21) 1.80 (1.00) 
 Prom- 
NoComp 
233 1.99 (1.29) 1.95 (1.14) 6.09 (1.13) 1.62 (0.86) 
 NoProm-
Comp 
234 4.04 (1.67) 4.56 (1.52) 5.12 (1.52) 3.06 (1.50) 
 Prom-
Comp 
234 4.15 (1.57) 4.88 (1.32) 4.95 (1.56) 3.12 (1.40) 
Interaction effect Sector*Promising*Offering compensation 
Page 23 
 
public NoProm-
NoComp 
115 2.59 (1.28) 3.27 (1.34) 5.80 (1.31) 1.90 (1.03) 
 Prom- 
NoComp 
116 1.94 (1.30) 1.81 (1.01) 5.98 (1.16) 1.69 (0.96) 
 NoProm-
Comp 
119 4.03 (1.80) 4.60 (1.61) 5.05 (1.60) 3.10 (1.59) 
 Prom-
Comp 
126 4.16 (1.62) 4.90 (1.39) 4.90 (1.60) 3.11 (1.41) 
private NoProm-
NoComp 
121 2.14 (1.15) 2.70 (1.41) 6.13 (1.09) 1.71 (0.98) 
Prom- 
NoComp 
117 2.05 (1.28) 2.08 (1.24) 6.19 (1.08) 1.54 (0.76) 
NoProm-
Comp 
115 4.05 (1.53) 4.52 (1.42) 5.20 (1.42) 3.02 (1.41) 
Prom-
Comp 
108 4.15 (1.53) 4.86 (1.24) 5.00 (1.53) 3.14 (1.39) 
 
 
The effects of Promising Compensation (H2 and H3) 
As Table 3 shows, there is a main effect of Promising Compensation on procedural justice. 
However, we also see that this main effect is qualified by an interaction effect of promising and 
offering compensation on distributive and procedural justice. Simple contrast analyses to test 
whether NoProm-Comp would lead to more positive evaluations than Prom-Comp (H2) showed 
that these two scenarios do not lead to significant differences in distributive justice (p = 0.393; 
SE = .134), negative emotions (p = 0.173; SE = .126) and post-recovery satisfaction (p = 0.576; 
SE = .113). However, there is a significant difference for procedural justice (p = 0.010; SE = 
.125). Hence, H2 can only be confirmed for procedural justice. 
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In H3 we hypothesized that both compensation scenarios (Prom-Comp and NoProm-Comp) 
would lead to more positive evaluations than NoProm-NoComp. As in study 1, additional 
simple contrast analysis and specific t-tests were used to compare means of these three scenarios 
involved. These confirm H3 for all dependent variables. Distributive justice for NoProm-Comp 
is significantly higher (p = 0.000; SE = .134) than for NoProm-NoComp. Also, Prom-Comp 
leads to a significantly higher level than NoProm-NoComp (t(468) = 13.72, p = 0.000). 
Procedural justice for the NoProm-Comp scenario is significantly higher (p = 0.000; SE = .124) 
than NoProm-NoComp. Also, procedural justice for the Prom-Comp scenario is significantly 
higher than NoProm-NoComp (t(468) = 15.08, p = 0.000). For negative emotions, NoProm-
Comp leads to significantly less negative emotions (p = 0.000; SE = .126) than NoProm-
NoComp. This is also the case for Prom-Comp (t(468) = -7.92, p = 0.000). Finally, both 
NoProm-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .113) and Prom-Comp (t(468) = 11.77, p = 0.000) lead to 
significant higher levels of post-recovery satisfaction than NoProm-NoComp.  
 
The effects of double deviation (H4) 
Testing whether Prom-NoComp (double deviation) would lead to significantly more negative 
evaluations than NoProm-NoComp (H4a) analysing the interaction effects with simple contrast 
analyses reveals that this could be confirmed for distributive justice (p = 0.005; SE = .134) and 
procedural justice  (p = 0.000; SE = .124), but not for negative emotions (p = 0.345; SE = .126) 
and post-recovery satisfaction (p = 0.102; SE = .113). 
Simple contrast analysis and specific t-tests revealed that hypothesis H4b can be confirmed for 
all dependent variables. Prom-NoComp leads to a significantly lower distributive justice than 
Prom-Comp  (p = 0.000; SE = .134) and NoProm-Comp (t(465) = -14.84, p = 0.000). Procedural 
justice for Prom-NoComp is significantly lower than Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .125) and 
NoProm-Comp (t(465) = -20.98, p = 0.000). Negative emotions for Prom-NoComp are 
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significantly higher than for Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .127) and NoProm-Comp (t(465) = 
7.82, p = 0.000). Finally, post-recovery satisfaction for Prom-NoComp is significantly lower 
than for Prom-Comp (p = 0.000; SE = .113) and NoProm-Comp (t(465) = -12.72, p = 0.000).  
 
Differences between two sectors (H5) 
To study the Sector effects we looked at the main and all interaction effects involving Sector 
(see Table 3). As Table 3 shows, there is a main Sector effect on negative emotions. The private 
scenarios (M = 5.65; SD = 1,39) lead to significantly (F(1,929) = 5.00, p = 0.026) more negative 
emotions than the public organization (M = 5.42; SD = 1.50). Overall, the data suggest that 
Sector did not seem to affect customers’ perceived distributive justice, procedural justice or 
post-recovery satisfaction, thus confirming H5 for these dependent variables. However, we also 
see that there is an interaction effect (F(1,929) = 6.15, p = .013) of Sector and Promising 
Compensation on procedural justice. A simple contrast analysis shows that not promising 
compensation leads to a significantly (p = 0.010; SE = .124) higher level for the public (M = 
3.94; SE = 0.088) than for the private scenario (M = 3.61; SE = 0.088). For the scenarios 
promising compensation does not lead to significant differences (p = 0.360; SE = .125). Finally, 
for procedural justice there is an interaction effect between Sector, Promising and Offering 
compensation (F(1,929) = 5.09, p = .024). A close inspection of the pattern of means (see Table 
4), shows that within the private setting, there is only an effect of offering compensation: People 
perceive lower procedural justice when there is no compensation (M = 2.70 and 2.08 
respectively) than when there is compensation (M = 4.52 and 4.86 respectively). However, this 
pattern is different within the public domain. Promising compensation, but not offering it 
(Prom-NoComp) leads to much lower perceived procedural justice (M  = 1.81) compared to 
NoProm-NoComp (M = 3.27). There is no difference between NoProm-Comp (M = 4.60) and 
Prom-Comp (M = 4.90). Compared to Study 1, these results seem to suggest that Sector might 
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moderate some of the effects offering and promising compensation has. We do need to 
emphasize though, that similar to Study 1, the conclusions of these findings need to be taken 
with caution given the effect Sector had on our control variable. 
 
Summary of two studies 
The results of both studies are summarized in table 5 showing that hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4b and 5 
have many similarities. For H4a the results of both studies are mixed. 
 
Table 5. Results of two studies 
 Study 1 Study 2 
H1. Comp leads to more 
positive evaluations than 
NoComp 
Confirmed: all dependent 
variables. 
Confirmed: all dependent 
variables. 
H2. Prom-Comp leads to 
more negative evaluations 
than NoProm-Comp 
Not confirmed: all 
dependent variables. 
 
  
Confirmed: procedural 
justice. 
Not confirmed: distributive 
justice, negative emotions, 
post-recovery satisfaction. 
H3. Prom-Comp and 
NoProm-Comp lead to more 
positive evaluations than 
NoProm-Comp  
Confirmed: distributive and 
procedural justice, post-
recovery satisfaction.  
Not confirmed: negative 
emotions. 
Confirmed: all dependent 
variables. 
H4a. Prom-NoComp leads 
to less positive evaluations 
than NoProm-NoComp   
Confirmed: procedural 
justice, negative emotions 
and post-recovery 
satisfaction. 
Not confirmed: distributive 
justice. 
Confirmed: distributive and 
procedural justice 
Not confirmed: negative 
emotions and post-recovery 
satisfaction. 
H4b. Prom-NoComp leads 
to less positive evaluations 
Confirmed: all dependent 
variables. 
Confirmed: all dependent 
variables. 
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than Prom-Comp and 
NoProm-Comp  
H5. Results of H1-H4 are 
similar for public and 
private settings  
Confirmed (but with 
caution): all dependent 
variables. 
Confirmed (but with 
caution): all dependent 
variables, except for 
interaction effects with 
Promising and Offering 
Compensation on procedural 
justice. 
 
 
Discussion 
Two experiments amongst Dutch students (study 1) and US citizens (study 2) researched the 
effects of promising and offering a small monetary compensation after a service failure in public 
and private settings. Eight scenarios were used to determine the effects of these independent 
variables on customers’ evaluations of distributive and procedural justice, negative emotions 
and post-recovery satisfaction. The results let us conclude that offering compensation after a 
service failure significantly improved customers’ evaluations. Promising compensation 
explicitly before a service failure had no effect on these evaluations. When compensation was 
promised, but not offered, this led to significantly more negative evaluations than when it was 
offered. Finally, the sector (public vs. private) did not seem to moderate the effects of promising 
and offering compensation on customers’ evaluations (with one exception in Study 2). 
 
This research adds to public management literature. It is the first study to apply justice theory 
(Adams 1965) in public service recovery settings and proves itself relevant. The results show 
monetary compensation is a powerful instrument to restore customers’ perceived loss and 
contribute to the restoration of satisfaction after a service failure; an effect already found in 
private settings (e.g. Wirtz and Mattila 2004) and now confirmed in public settings. However, 
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from an ethical and legal perspective, offering individual customers compensation may not 
always be desirable or possible. One reason is that such compensation has to be paid from 
general tax revenues. This benefits individual citizens and could lead to inequalities and 
stimulate a claim culture. Also, customers as taxpayers could object to public organisations 
using tax money to compensate customers. 
 
Second, based on expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993) we expected that explicitly 
promising compensation prior to the failure would lead to more negative customers’ evaluations 
compared to when it has not been promised. This is based on the effect that expectations 
increase, while experiences stay the same. Our results show that this is not the case. From a 
service recovery perspective, promising compensation has no effects on customers’ 
evaluations. However, expectancy disconfirmation theory is clearly supported in the case of a 
double deviation where the promised compensation is not offered. When expectations of 
receiving compensation are set and, subsequently, not fulfilled, this leads to very negative 
evaluations. From a managerial perspective, the question is: what sense does it make to promise 
compensation explicitly? Where no second failures are made, it does not lead to better 
evaluations. In the case of a double deviation, it leads to extreme negative evaluations. Finally, 
we expected that, in the direct-exchange scenarios where customers directly pay for services, 
there would be no difference in customers’ evaluations between the public and private settings. 
Although we found some main and interaction effects involving sector, we can conclude that 
the sector has no mediating effects on customers’ evaluations.  
 
Our study also has some limitations, which could lead to new lines of future research. First, 
while we tried to develop realistic scenarios with similar failures with a similar severity, 
participants of both studies perceived the private scenarios more realistic than the public 
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scenarios; probably because offering service charters and monetary compensation are not yet 
common public practices. This scenario could be re-examined when service charters and 
monetary compensation do become more common to see whether the difference in perceived 
realism will disappear. Also, because we did not anticipate this effect on perceived realism, we 
did not disentangle whether the impact of positive and normative expectations (cf. James 2011) 
on customers’ evaluations are related to realism. For now, we need to interpret the significant 
effects of Sector with caution, because they could be partly explained in terms of perceived 
realism rather than Sector itself. We therefore also cannot draw strong conclusions regarding 
to H5 (difference in effects between private vs. public). Second, we intentionally kept the 
interaction with the employee (interactional justice) constant in order to focus on the effects of 
compensation and the pay-out process. In follow-up studies the effects of employees behaviour 
on the effects of compensation could be researched. Third, we simulated using one type and 
level of severity of service failure and one type and size of monetary compensation. Future 
research could investigate whether different types of failures and compensation, different 
severity levels of failures and different sizes of compensation influence customers’ evaluations. 
It could also look for the specific effects of promising compensation on customers’ expectations 
(e.g. could size of compensation moderate the effect) to understand better the impact of 
expectations. To expand the knowledge on the effects of compensation future research could 
study public services (other than governmental visa organisations and municipalities issuing 
drivers licenses) with a broad spectrum of all public customer segments. Finally, research could 
be conducted in non-direct exchange situations where public services are paid with taxpayers’ 
money. Despite these limitations, our research has given early insights into the effects of 
promising and offering monetary compensation in public service recovery situations. 
 
Appendix I. Vignettes for manipulations of dependent variables  
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Sector Vignettes 
Municipality 
(study 1) 
‘In a month your driver license is expired. You have been at the 
municipality office to apply for a new one (costs approximately 40 euro). 
After a couple of days you receive a message that it is ready for pickup 
and you go to the municipality office.’  
Visa 
governmental 
organisation 
(study 2) 
‘In a month you have to be in another country for which a travel visa is 
required which costs you approximately 40 dollar. You have ordered it by 
internet. After a couple of days you receive a message that it is ready for 
pickup at the office (about 20 minutes drive from home) and you go to the 
office.’  
Internet store 
(study 1 and 2) 
‘You have made an online order on the web shop of the only store that 
offers this product (costs approximately 40 euro/dollar). It is a gift for a 
friends’ birthday next month. You have indicated that you want to collect 
the parcel at a pick up point. After a couple of days you receive a message 
that it is ready for pickup and you go to the pick up point (study 2: about 
20 minutes drive from home).’ 
All scenarios Followed by…. ‘Now you are at the desk, and the employee informs you 
that the driver license/package/visa (dependent on study and scenario) is 
not there. The employee checks the system and informs you that it is still 
on its way. It will be available tomorrow’. Only in the four ‘compensation 
promised’ scenarios a service charter with an explicit compensation was 
visible behind the desk: ‘We keep our promises, if not, you’ll get a gift 
voucher worth 5 euro/dollar’. Only in the four ‘compensation offered’ 
scenarios the customer received proactively a gift voucher. The scenario 
ends with the customer leaving the hypothetical building. Participants then 
answer a number of questions related to the dependent variables. 
 
 
Appendix II. Scales for dependent variables  
Severity of failure  
 
(1) How would you rate the importance of the service failure? 
(1=unimportant 7= extremely important) 
Distributive justice (1) The compensation for the inconvenience is fair 
(2) I did not receive what I deserve (R) 
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(study 1  = 0.76; 
study 2  = 0.91) 
(3) The outcome I received was not fair (R) 
 (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
Procedural justice 
(study 1  = 0.88; 
study 2  = 0.89) 
(1) The organisation used a good procedure to solve my problem 
(2) If I was an employee of that organisation, I would have acted 
similarly 
(3) I felt taken seriously 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
Negative emotions 
(study 1  = 0.90; 
study 2  = 0.95) 
(1) How annoyed would you be? 
(2) How irritated would you be? 
(1=not at all, 7=extremely so) 
Post-recovery 
satisfaction 
(study 1  = 0.75; 
study 2  = 0.94) 
 
(1) Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied did this experience make you 
feel? (1=very dissatisfied, 7=very satisfied) 
(2) How well did this service experience meet your needs? (1=not at 
all, 7=absolutely yes) 
(3) Overall, I am very satisfied with this experience. (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
Realism of scenario (1) To what extent do you think this was a realistic situation?  
(1=not at all realistic, 7=very realistic) 
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